

## Final Report

I presented a paper titled “Politicians: Experimental Evidence on Candidacy and Performance” at the Annual Political Science Association meetings on September 1<sup>st</sup>. The paper was part of a panel that I put together for the conference. Details of the panel are below. The papers all related to the theme of incentives that politicians and bureaucrats face in the process of development. I had the opportunity to present a perspective on this from Pakistan. Non-security related research on Pakistan was significant in its absence at the conference, so my work was an outlier on research on Pakistan in that respect. We had good attendance at the panel, comprising both faculty and graduate students from several universities.

### **Accountability and Corruption: Political Elites in Developing Democracies**

Thu, September 1, 10:00 to 11:30am, PCC, 204-B

Session Submission Type: Full Panel

Bureaucratic Discretion in Clientelistic Contexts: Evidence from Malawi - Sarah Andrews, University of Virginia

Party-Centered Corruption and the Political Control of Bureaucrats - Sarah Brierley, UCLA

Can SMS-Mobilization Increase Citizen Reporting of Public Service Deficiencies? - Guy Grossman, University of Pennsylvania; Kristin Grace Michelitch, Vanderbilt University

Politicians: Experimental Evidence on Candidacy and Performance - Saad Ahmad Gulzar, New York University; Yasir Khan, International Growth Center

Bureaucrats vs. Politicians: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Oversight - Pia Raffler, Yale/Princeton

### **Chair**

Daniel S. Treisman, University of California, Los Angeles

### **Discussant**

Daniel W. Gingerich, University of Virginia