1. I presented two solo-authored papers. The first panel was on September 30<sup>th</sup> – The Political Economy of Globalization in South Asia.

Paper Title: Aiding Compliance: Foreign Aid and Social Security Programs in Pakistan **Abstract**: The relevance of foreign aid to developing countries has been resoundingly upheld in the current pandemic; many countries, including Pakistan, have actively sought fiscal and technical support from their allies to enhance government response to the disease. However, a successful response depends on the cooperation of the public and their willingness to abide by public health orders, which depends at least partly on their assessment of government performance. This paper examines the direct and indirect effects of foreign aid on COVID-19 compliance; does information about foreign aid funding affect individuals' assessment of their own government and its ability to deal with the pandemic? Does it, as a cross-domain spillover, affect individuals' willingness to comply with public health orders? I ask these questions in the context of Pakistan where the roll out of a stimulus payment program, titled Ehsaas was a key component of the government's response to the pandemic. Using a survey experiment fielded via telephone, I find that informing individuals about the foreign aid funding source of the stimulus payment program does not affect individuals' support for it, which remains overwhelmingly high. In addition, individuals do not change their assessment of government performance in response to information about foreign aid; they do, however, believe that their government is more credible in the reporting of COVID-19 cases. Information of foreign aid also does not affect willingness to comply with public health orders. Finally, Ehsaas recipients offer higher approval of the program compared to nonrecipients and are also more likely than non-recipients to comply with public health orders. This indicates that the program has some success in addressing the poor's vulnerability to the pandemic.

2. The second panel was on October 2<sup>nd</sup> and was a TLC Workshop on Organizing and Supporting Virtual Junior Scholar Workshops.

I spoke about ensuring representation on junior scholar workshops from my experience of organizing **WPESA**. I can share my slides on request.

**Abstract:** Representation: how can junior scholar workshops create inclusive, diverse, and equitable spaces for junior scholars? Enhancing opportunities for under-represented groups in political science requires attention to the structure / marketing / conduct of the workshop. We offer insights into how diversity and inclusion initiatives play out in the practice of these workshops and provide concrete steps individuals can take to improve access and support for URM scholars. We also discuss how inclusion in virtual workshops must address differences in time zones, institutional support, stages of junior scholar progress, and care obligations.

3. The third panel was on **October 3<sup>rd</sup>** titled **The Consequences of Credit Claiming.** I presented the following paper:

Paper title: Voter Preferences and Foreign Aid: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan

**Abstract:** Foreign aid is an unearned resource that interrupts the fiscal contract between voters and politicians. Recent literature in political science has attributed the electoral consequences of foreign aid to credit claiming by politicians (Cruz and Schneider 2017) or to the ability of politicians to allocate these funds strategically (Briggs 2012; Jablonski 2014). However, both these mechanisms assume that voters lack information about aid attributability and politicians' programmatic efforts; better informed voters would not reward politicians for foreign aid. However, in countries with low tax-to-GDP ratios and high aid dependency, voters are fraught between choosing leaders who are better situated at securing foreign aid and leaders who are more likely to uphold national pride by rejecting foreign aid. In a survey experiment conducted amongst Pakistani undergraduate students. I find that voters are more likely to choose candidates with characteristics that signal their ability to secure foreign aid funding. I also find that voters are more likely to opt for public goods that provide them immediate benefits in the form of cash handouts. I suggest that one reason why better education and previous work in international organizations improves electability is because projects financed through foreign aid are perceived as more credible. This suggests that voters consciously account for the presence of foreign aid while making voting decisions and do not vote for politicians on the basis of misinformation.