

## **Proposal Title: “Living in Ungoverned Space: Pakistan’s Frontier Crimes Regulation”**

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During colonial rule, the British consciously left half of present-day Pakistan effectively ungoverned by dividing the country into two distinct regions. The first region was what we think of as the Raj—areas where the British built modern political and bureaucratic institutions. This included a modern legal system, a tax system, a civil service, and an army. The second region was governed according to the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). In this region, the British put a small number of ‘political agents’ in charge of large tribal areas with almost no colonial institutions backing them. Instead, already existing institutions were given the force of law. Traditional local councils, or jirgas, made most legal decisions. Over time, substantial portions of Pakistan have been removed from the FCR, but the law still applies to parts of Pakistan, primarily in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). A series of national governments, starting with the British colonists, have followed an explicit policy of neglecting state capacity in this region.

Based on primary legal documents, I have created a dataset that records when and where FCR was applied in Pakistan between 1901 and 2013 at the sub-district level. Figure 1 provides maps based on these data. They reveal a few interesting patterns. First, the British did not change the geographic application of the FCR between 1848 and 1947. Second, the area under the FCR is highly agro-climatically and ethnically diverse, in contrast to the simple hypotheses that these areas are too rugged to govern or inhabited only by ethnic groups that reject central governance (Scott, 2009). Third, the first major changes to the FCR were not until 1956, and they involved both adding some districts to the region governed by the FCR and removing other districts from it, suggesting that the factors determining the viability of governance change over time.

The FCR is unusual in providing a well-defined and significant demarcation between governed and ungoverned space, allowing for careful empirical tests of hypotheses related to three lines of inquiry. I propose to empirically investigate: (i) the factors that determined where the British decided to build colonial institutions; (ii) why the FCR has persisted in some regions and not in others; and (iii) the effects of a lack of governance on political violence and economic development. Specifically, I intend to test the following:

- H1: The availability of resources, and the ease with which they could be extracted, determined the initial set of institutions (Diamond, 1997; Sachs 2001; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). Specifically, it was optimal from the perspective of British colonizers to set up extractive institutions in these areas.
- H2: Natural terrain, and the military advantage it afforded indigenous groups, made full colonization impractical (Fearon and Laitin, 2003)
- H3: The economic benefits of developing full institutions in FCR regions to the colonizer, through taxation and resource extraction, outweighed the costs of implementation.
- H4: It was more efficient to easier to maintain order in these regions through a system of indirect governance (Padró-i-Miquel and Yared, 2012).

To test these hypotheses, I will take advantage of four unusually rich sets of data. First, despite building no institutions in these areas, the British kept exceptionally rich records, including decennial censuses that include rich data on economic activity and economic viability. Second, the modern government has run a series of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) as well as Multi-Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), which can provide evidence of the economic effects. Third, Empirical Studies of Conflict at Princeton has compiled a set of Tehsil-level violent incidents covering the period 1988 to 2012, allowing an examination of the effects of a lack of governance on local political violence. Fourth, the US Geological Survey has recorded mineral explorations and discoveries. This could provide an indication of whether mineral discoveries lead to a change in incentives.

This research is important for policy. Leaving spaces ungoverned carries consequences for the security policy of Pakistan – a country that has suffered large losses from militancy. Furthermore, understanding political economy causes of the persistence of ungoverned spaces is imperative for those that hope to bring state services to these areas. Finally, demonstrating the long-term development consequences of living outside the ambit of the state is important for the decision calculus of politicians and civil society advocates.




Figure 1 Application of FCR over time (based on long time series of primary data)

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