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I presented three papers. I will address each in turn below. Before doing so, I will note that the International Studies Association annual meeting is the most important meeting for me professionally. Your support, along with that of my program, enabled this participation. Without both sources of support, I would not have been able to attend.

Madrassahs as a Civil Society Organization: Exploring the Connections Between Madrassahs Attendance and Support for Violence in Pakistan

There is a rich debate about the linkages between civil society and conflict. Some research finds that specific kinds of civil society organizations (CSOs) dampen ethnic, sectarian, communal conflict; other research comes to the opposite conclusion. There are several explanations for these varying results, including: the particular definition of “civil society” employed, the goals and organization CSOs, and the ways in which these CSOs engage their societies. I examine one particular kind of CSO, the madrassah (religious seminary) in one particular country, Pakistan. Madrassahs are a very important kind of Pakistani CSO, which many Pakistanis hold in high regard. I use a rigorously designed survey that I fielded in 2013 among a 7,000-person nationally representative sample that collects detailed information about the respondents (i.e. the educational background, including secular and religious education; sectarian commitments; piety and knowledge of Islam; attitudes towards various kinds of ethnic, sectarian and communal violence). I find that controlling for numerous factors including sectarian tradition espoused and other kinds of educational attainment, madrassah attendance explains support for several kinds of violence even though individuals will attend a madrassah for a very brief tenure. I argue that the mechanism that accounts this correlation is the deeply sectarian education curriculum that students use in Pakistan’s madrassahs and the ways in which madrassahs engage the communities in which they are situated.

Pakistani Conceptualization of Shari`a and Support for Militancy and Democratic Values: A New Empirical Approach

In this paper, my colleagues and I argue that empirical studies of the relationship between popular support for Islamism and support for democracy and violence have yielded inconclusive results, largely because scholars inadequately operationalize respondent support for shari`a. Focusing on Pakistan, we demonstrate how using different conceptualizations of shari`a has direct impacts upon the observed correlation between such support and support for democratic values and Islamic militant groups. We use data derived from a carefully designed survey instrument that offers unique insights into how Pakistanis define a shari`a-based government. We find that formalizing an Islamic government as one that implements shari`a by providing services and security for the people is associated with increased support for democratic values, whereas conceptualizing an Islamic government as one that implements shari`a by imposing hudud punishments and restricting women's public roles is associated with increased support for militancy. These results suggest that depending on how individuals within a particular context and time period construe a shari`a-based government, public support for the multifaceted shari`a can either be a positive force for democracy or a predictor of support for

militancy. These results have important implications for survey work, which must elicit a better understanding of respondents' beliefs about shari`a-based government.

The Domestic Politics of Jihad in Pakistan: The Case of Lashkar-e-Taiba

Most analysis of Pakistani terrorist groups focus upon the ways in which Pakistan instrumentalizes them to secure its objectives in India and Afghanistan. I have argued that this focus upon the external utility of these groups under-estimates their value to the Pakistani state. Here I focus upon the most lethal of these groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), expositing the domestic politics of this organization and the internal goals of the state that LeT services. Pakistan massively invests in the domestic infrastructure of LeT to help it teach (dawa) and proselytize (tabligh) its version of the Ahl-e-Hadith creed. I argue that Pakistan does this because LeT is the only organization in Pakistan that actively poses an ideological counterweight to the numerous Deobandi militant groups assaulting the state. LeT competes with these other groups and acts as a bulwark against their devastating, anti-state discourse and terror campaign. This explains Pakistan unstinting support despite mounting international pressure to eliminate LeT. I employ discourse analysis to a relatively untapped source of data: thousands of pages of the group's own publications, which I have curated over several decades. Their publications significantly resemble those of Pakistan's army reflecting the close ideological and organizational association between the two groups.